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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS 
A-50 - Aerozine 50 - a s!llOrable fuel blend of 50 % hydrazine (N2H4) and 
-- 50 % unsymmetrical dimet~J;rydrazine (UDMH) by weight. 
active failure - Instances in which the propulsion system exploded, dis-
integrated or in other violent ways failed to carry-out its func-
tion. 
Agena - Space vehicle upper stage developed for the U. S. Air Force by 
Lockheed aircraft. Propellants: nitric acid and unsymmetrical di-
methylhydrazine (UDMH). 
Apollo program - NASA's third manned program; preceded by the Mercury and 
Gemini programs. 
Centaur - The first U.S. space vehicle upper stage to employ the cryo-
genic propellants liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. 
cryogenics - Liquefied gas propellants with very low boiling points 
(-230 F to -430 F) at ambient pressure and a low critical tempera~ 
ture (10 F to -400 F). 
Gatv - A vehicle in the Gemini program which was used to demonstrate the 
rendervous and docking abilities of the space program, a major step 
to lunar landing. 
hypergolic propellants - Rocket propellants that ignite spontaneously 
when mixed with each oth.e1.. 
LH2 - Liquid hydrogen - a cryogenic liquid fuel used in the Centaur ve-
hicle. 
LM APS - Lunar module ascent propulsion system - the engine and system 
which is used to take off from the moon's surface and rejoin the 
command and service module. 
LM DPS - Lunar module descent propulsion system - the engine and system 
which is used to take the lunar module out of orbit and down to the 
surface of the moon. 
LM RCS - Lunar module reaction control system - it controls the lunar 
module role and pitch. 
v 
LOX - Liquid oxygen - a cryogenic liquid oxidizer used in the Centaur 
vehicle. 
N2H4 - Hydazine - a storable liquid fuel. 
N204 - Nitrogen tetraoxide 
pollo spacecraft. 
a storable liquid oxidizer used in the A-
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration - The U. S. agency 
re~ponsible for all civilian aeronautical and space activities. 
passive failure - Instances in which the propulsion system underper-
formed or otherwise failed to provide the necessary support. 
RFNA - Red-fuming nitric acid - an oxidizer used in the Agena vehicle. 
RP-1 - A highly refined kerosene fuel. 
RSO - Range Safety Officer - An official monitor of the course of a roc-
ket. If the vehicle goes seriously off course, he must give the 
command destruct signal, which blows it up, to insure that it does 
not come down on land or in busy shipping lanes. 
SM RCS - Service module reaction control system - It controls spacecraft 
rates, rotation, and minor translations in all axes. 
SPS ~ Service propulsion system - The main propulsion engine, providing 
thrust for all major velocity changes throughout a mission. 
Saturn V - The 281-ft. (363 ft. with spacecraft), three stage launch ve-
hicle for Apollo. 
Space Shuttle System - A post-Apollo project known as the space transpor~'.-
tatio~ system. The program objective is to develop a re-usable ve-
hicle - half rocket, half aircraft - to reduce the cost of space 
flight. 
storables - Liquid propellants which are stable over a reasonable range 
of temperature and pressure, and are sufficiently nonreactive with 
construction materials to permit storage in closed containers for 
periods of a year or more. 
Tug/third stage - Third stage option of the Shuttle System; used if it 
is necessary for higher orbit insertion of payloads. 




A STUDY OF THE ACCIDENT/FAILURE EXPERIENCE 
OF CRYOGENIC AND STORABLE PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
"!NTRODUCTION 
With the return of the final Skylab crew, the space program will 
undertake a brief Russian - American joint venture before turning atten-
tion to the Space Shuttle System. Although several years from realiza-
tion, the shuttle system is well into engineering development. 
The shuttle program will utilize two pieces of hardware--an orbiter 
and a booster. On the launch pad, the orbiter will be mounted piggyback 
on the large booster tank. The booster will launch the orbiter to an 
altitude of about 22 nautical miles. The orbiter, with its payload and 
crew, will detach from:the booster and fire into an orbit path. This 
orbiter has the capability of carrying into orbit a Tug/third stage, to 
deliver payloads to even higher orbits. After a 7 to 30 day mission, 
the orbiter will fire out of orbit and land on earth, much like a conven-
tional plane. 
Of the Shuttle System's estimated 500 flights, 200 will require the 
Tug/third stage. 
The Problem 
There are two propellent systems under consideration for the~T.ug/ 
third stage -- cryogenic and storable. Since each system has some ad-
2 
vantages over the other, the decision of which system to use will probably 
be influenced by safety considerations. 
This study is undertaken in order to provide an input in determining 
which system would be safer, from a his tori cal '2:i..ewpoin t, for use in the 
shuttle program. 
The intent of this study is (1) to develop a methodology and concep-
tual framework for the analysis of accident/failure experience and (2) to 
use this methodology to gather, analyze, and report the accident/failure 
experience of the two propellent systems. 
A cdmplex selection problem arises because of the dispersion of data 
and the consequential reliance upon intuitive measures by program offi-
cials. This lack of information, coupled with the prospect of up to 200 
shuttle missions requiring the Tug/third stage, has prompted officials 
to make a complete examination of operations. 
· The Issues 
The principal hazards of concern in the use of a cryogenic Tug/third 
stage as a payload in the orbiter cargo bay are the following; 
(1) high-pressure-developing liquids; 
(2) high energy propellants in large quantities; 
(3) cold liquids and surfaces; 
(4} 6xygen-enriched atmospheres. 
The principal hazards of concern in the use of a storable Tug/third 
stage as a payload in the orbiter cargo bay are the Eullowing: 
(1) propellants of high energy in large quantities; 
(2) propellants caustic to skin and to respiratory tract; 
(3) propellants that ignite hypergolically; 
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(4) propellants that react spontaneously with certain materials. 
These eight hazards are the central issues in assessing the risk of 
either system. Of particular interest to program officials is the ex-
perience record of the Agena and Centaur vehicles, since uprated versions 
of these stages are two prime Tug/third stage candidates. The Agena uti-
lizes a storabl>i!. propellant system employing as an oxidizer.red fuming 
nitric acid (RFNA) and as a fuel unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH). 
The Centaur utilizes a cryogenic system employing as an oxidizer liquid 
oxygen (LOX) and as2a fuel liquid hydrogen (LH2). (An examination of the 
Agena and Centaur propellant hazards is presented in Appendix A)· 
A Preview 
This study will attempt to resolve the issue of propellant hazards 
by investigating two operating areas, flight and ground support opera-
tions which are fundamentally different from the Shuttle application, 
and in whic~ fuel type becomes a factor in safe operations. 
Propulsion failures associatedi;cflight, flight failures, are instances 
which, because of the inability of a system to perform its required func-
tion, jeopardize the safety of the craft, crew, or mission. The classi-
fication "flight failures" stresses the importance of a propellant as a 
part of a system and side-steps the issue of determining which failures 
were due solely to the nature of the propellant and which were not. 
Propellant accidents associated with the non-flight use of propell-
ants, ground support accidents, involve the hazards inherent in storing, 
transporting, loading and testing. These hazards are related not to the 
propellants as a part of a system, but to the inherent danger and nature 
of the propellant. 
This study will examine the flight experience,::Ofmajor NASA launch 
vehicles and of the Apollo program systems. The ground support exper-
ience will come from the mishaps encountered in the Apollo program. 
Flight failures and ground support accidents will re considered in 
the total safety experience of the propellants. 
4 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review describes (1) the analytical tools of per-
sonnel and organizations concerned with accidents and failures and (2) 
previous studies of propellant hazards and mishaps. 
St~dy Methods 
The disciplines of safety and reliability employ both quantitative 
and qualitative evaluations in their analysis of accident and failure 
experience in an effort to provide a reasonable safe produce and/or pro-
duction process. 
Quantitative Methods 
Risk measurement is needed because of contemporary problesm in the 
safety field. The quantitative measurement of hazard risks improves 
safety management decisions. In the past, risk evaluation has been mainly 
a management decision process involving expert judgment. The complexity 
of systems, plus the interaction of system characteristics, necessitates 
an objective quantitative method £or risk measurement. The risk problem 
resolution must ultimately depend on management decisions; however, an 
analytical measurement of risk is highl}t;,desirable to reduce human judg-
ment errors and to optimize program costs. 
The risk (R) associated with a given hazard is taken as the product 
of the damage from a particular accident (Di) and the probability of occur-
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rence of that accident (P.) .sunnned over all accidents:1 . 1 
""' R= ~D.P. 
,., 1 1 
6 
(1) 
The damage term (D.) can be expressed in a variety of ways, such $ dol-
1 
lars, injuries, or overexposures, but must be in the same units through-
out the analysis. 
liability analysis. 
The probability term (P.), can be developed by a re-
1 
The above expression (equation 1) accounts for both 
the severity and frequency of accidents and provides a single value for 
use in weighing hazards against potential benefits. 
Another approach to system safety evaluation is to weigh the impor;,,oo. 
tance attached by the system to completion of stated objectives. 2 The 
hazard (H) associated with a given system is the produce of that system's 
failure rate(~), its operation time (T), and its criticality value (B): 
H=l.~T·B (2) 
This expression (equation 2) accounts for the possiblity of failure, 
but does not quantitatively account for damage. Instead, a subjective in-
dex (criticality index) is developed to :measure the importance of the sys-
tem and the consequences involved in a loss of that f¥Stem. Hypothetical 
criticality values might be expressed in the following manner: 
1.0 = catastrophic 
Q,.,5 = critical 
1 
see S. Canale. Hazard Risk .Measurement and Optimization. Goddard 
SpacewEl.ight Center: Government-Industry System Safety Conference (May 
1-3, 1968), pp. 205-208. 
2 see R. M. Wolf. The Application and Implementation of a System 
Safety Engineering Analysis, presented at Apl. 9th Liquid Propulsion Sym-
posium, (Sept. 1967), pp. 327-244. 
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0.3 = major 
0.0 = .none. 
Since the system's safeness (S)is equal to 1 minus its hazardness 
(unsafety), safeness can be expressed: 
s = 1 (). • T • B). (3) 
The values of these two expressions (equations 2 and 3) are not absolute 
(as in the first summation), but are indices to compare one component or 
system against ano the.r. 
Qualita ti,ve,-:.Me thods· ·.· 
A qualitative approach to the measurement of risk ~ews the problem 
as a need to understand the kinds of mishaps that happen and the ways in 
which they occur. A number of methods have been developed by reliability 
and safety engineers to determine, on an a priori basis, problems that 
could arise from malfunctions of hardware. 3 · Variously called Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Criticality Analysis (CA) Failure Modes, 
Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA), 
these approaches are very si~iliar, usually differIDJigg only in the names 
given by the organization developing them. The analytical methods would 
anticipate such problems as the following: 
- seperation failure; 
- pressure burst; 
- propellant leakage; 
- inadvertant ignition. 
3see Willie Hammer. Handbook of System and Product Safety. Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972. pp. 148-159. 
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These events are some general classes of mishaps that can occur during 
a mission and are viewed by reliability and safety engineers as .. a<starting 
point for their safety analysis. Knowledge of concerns such as these are 
helpful in a posteriori sense to determine what pertinent information to 
look for in historical records. The reader is referred to the FMEA study4 
on the Space Tug. 
Previous.Studies 
There are a number of previous studies of propellent hazards/acci~. 
dents/lllli.sh~ps/failures which provide useful information and guidelines 
for the problem at hand. Figure 1, which follows, presents a synopsis of 
these studies and their source. 
4Boyde et. al. 
Analysis, Teledyne 
May,11, 1972. 
Space Tug Propulsion System Failure Modes and Effects 
Brown Engineering Research Park, Nuntsville, Ala., 
Figure 1: Previous Mishap Studies 
Source· 
Shuttle/Agena Study 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company 
Sunnyvale, California 
February 25, 1972 
Liquid Pro.pellant Rocket Engines: 
Their Status and Future 
S. F.Iacobellis 
Proceedings from "Reusable Launch and 
Reentry Vehicles for Space Fl;l.;,ght" 
short course, University of Tennessee 
August, 1969" 
Space Flight Hardware Accident 
Experience Report 




Analysis of Apollo Launch Operations 
Experience 
Hart 
NASA - KSC 
a paper presented to the AIAAtNASA 
Conference, Phoenix, Arizona 
March 16, 1971 
Description 
This study of the feasibility of employing the Agena as 
a Tug/third stage in the shuttle program includes a dis-
cussion (Agena Safety Histqry 7.2.2) of several accident 
associated with the storage, transfer, handling, and use 
of .:the propellants 
A review of large rocket engine systems (principally 
those engines used t.o power the booster and upper stages 
of launch vehicles) including a section on performance 
reliability, with success/failure assessment and accom-
panied reliability index. 
This report has been compiled from data contained in the 
investigation reports for specific accidents that have 
occurred during the test or operation of NASA hardware 
and that have involved major damage to the systemo 
An analysis of the failure that occurred with the command 
and service modules and launch vehicles during the pro-
cessing of Apollo 7 through Apollo 13, and a list of the 
criticality 01 and 02 failure for Apollo 7 - Apollo 13 
Figure 1 : (continued) 
Source 
Manned Program Accident/Incident 
Summaries (1963-1969) 
General Electric Company 
Daytona Beach, Florida 
March, 1970 
And 
Manned Program Accident/Incident 
Sunnnaries (1970-1971) 
Cranston Research, Inc. 
Alexandria, Virginia 
April, 1972 
Mishaps with Oxygen in NASA Operations 
Paul Ordin 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
November, 1971 
Liquefied Hydrogen Safety - A Review 
F. J. Ed~skuty and Roy Reider 
Los Alamos Scientific Lab 
Los Alamos, New Mexico. 
November,26, 1968 
Description 
In addition to the compilation and summary of mishaps in 
NASA operations, statistical information graphically shows 
information considered to be of value to management. (i.e. 
distribution or mishaps by systems, causes, program acti-
vity, accidents vs. incidents, injuries, fatalities, damage 
and human error). 
A presentation of data from a substantial nu~ber of oxy-
gen mishaps obtained from NASA and contractor records and 
descriptions of mishaps and their causes, for both liquid 
and gaseous oxygen accidents in ground test facilities and 
in space vehicle systems. Detailed descriptions of sever.,.. 
al accidents and incidents is given in order to define the 
combinations of conditions causing the mishap. Included 
(in addition to propellant system mishaps) are accident/ 
incidents which occurred in space and ground system struc-
tures, in electrical systems, in ground support facilities, 
in ordnance, and in related operations. 
The accident experience and accident potential in the use 
of liquefied hydrogen is e~amined with respect to cold da-
mage to tissue, asphyxiation, hydrogen-air (02) mi~tures, 
material properties, arid moisture condensation, and pres~ 
sure buildup 
Figure 1 (continued) 
Source 
Cryogenic Vs. Storable Propellants 
for the Space Tug 
T. York, R. Heser, and L. Trevino 
Boeing Company 
Houston, Texas 
October 26, 1973 
Review of Recent Launch Failures 
Report of the Subcommittee on NASA 
Oversight of the Committee 
on Science and Astronautics 
U. S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D. C. 
1971 
Description 
A study presenting a safety assessment of cryogenic and 
storable propellants to determine which would be safer 
for use on the Tug. Propellants currently being consider-
ed for the Tug are listed with associa.ted hazards. Also 
included is a tabulation of U. S. and international launch 
vehicles and an account of propellant related flight an4 
ground accidents/incidents that have occurred in the U. S. 
manned and unmanned space flight programs. A significant 
result of this study jg that human error was found to be 
the major contributor to accidents/inciqents irrespective 
of the propellant involved 
Public hearings exploring the causes of the launch fail-
ures of the OAO-B and Mariner 8 spacecrafts, and reviewing 
NASA's policies and practices regarding back spacecraft 
and recovery programs for unmanned missions. (The relia-
bility of the Centaur vehicle is of particular importance 
to ehe committee; at stake is a major portion of the NASA 
program of the 1970's). 
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Sunnnary 
This literature review sought to identify some analytical tools and 
how they were utilized in previous studies. The chosen studies. vary from 
short discussions of accidents to complete analysis of systems. These 
studies were taken from NASA as well as non-NASA sources (but all are 
concerned wfuth liquid rockets and propellants) and date no earlier than 
1968. 
METHODOLOGY 
A "total" approach to safety assessment must include both the sys-
tem risks and the operational (or ground support) risks of the two pro-
pellent systems under investigation. Ideally, the work would provide a 
statistical basis of comparison. Actually, inaccessible, unquantified, 
and incomplete data forces a qualitative comparison. 
Design of Inquiry 
In developing an investig~tive format, consideration must be given 
to decision needs, available methods, and anticipated problems. 
Decision Needs 
ual: 
The needs of the organization are described in the NASA Safety Man-
Knowledge of hazards is basic to the NASA Safety 
Program. Safety research is needed to provide 
additional information for use both in under-
standing the basic nature of hazards and in un-
derstanding effective means of eliminating or 
controlling hazards. Finally, data sources 
are needed both (a) to understand the history 
of exposure to and the effectiveness of ~ontrol 
of hazards., and (b) to interpret known data or 
define gaps in data on hazasds for design, opera-
tions or research purposes. 
511Basic Safety Requirement" NASA Safety Manual National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (July, 1969), paragraph 1800. 
13 
14 
This description of the input requirements does not specify the for-
mat but the content should be as reliable and usable as data in similar;: 
decision problems. As an indication of the information necessary for 
their decisions, the reader is again referred to the FMEA study by Boyd 
et. al. 
The Inquiry 
The ideal inquiry, involving a calculation.of risk measures similar 
to those described in the last section, places great importance on the 
substance and availability of the data. The ideal inquiry would be awk-
ward to implement because of the following difficulties: 
(1) Duration of Use - Accidents, or near accidents, are infrequent 
and it may take years to collect enough instances to form area-
sonable classification of the kinds of troubles that occur. 
(2} Exposure of Item - It is difficult to estimate exposure to the 
risk of accidents because it is virtually impossible to get any 
meaningful comparisons of the absolute or relative frequencies 
of occurrences of. various kinds of accidents. 
(3) Definition of Accident/Failure - In an operational system, each 
item is subject to different levels of stress and f'.udged by dif-
ferent criteria standards. 
(4) Accuracy of Evidence - It is difficult or impossible 1:!o recon-
struct and to derive the cgst of some accidents because of the 
hardware and program elements involved. 
The workable inquiry must allow for the imperfect arrangement of 
data. Proceeding from input, to process, to output would be conceptually 
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Simiilar to the process illustrated by Figure 2. This inquiry employs an 
interveniiil.gf; step: the determination of the relative exposure to acci-
dents and to failures. This inquiry also classifies accidents (rather 
than quantifying them) and defines system performance (in terms of either 
success or failure). 
Input Process Output 
Classify -1---il)lr ... Accident Modes/ 
Determin~ Mode Flight Measure 
!~!~~!--+-........ ==.~=~ I 
Accident "' Fa1.1ures :::+:::=-------.. . .._:,c1assify __ .... >, .. AccidenttCitasses0/ 







Exposu. re~~ l\.Classify Faru~ures/. System 
Parameter'\.. S .t ---!IIJI... '" ys em Measure 
t 
Classify Failure Modes/ -----Mode System Measure 
Figure 2: WORKABLE INQUIRY 
The principal sources of mishap documentation relative to space 
flight are the Mission Reports by NASA and i:j!s annual chronology Astron-
autics and Aeronautics. The mission reports for the manned programs are 
prepared by a mission evaluation team at NASA's Johnson Space Center and 
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evaluate, among other things, the spacecraft! launch vehicle, and crew 
performance. These evaluations are published in the first few months 
following the completion of a mission. 
Astronautics and Aeronautics compiles and verifies scattered infor-
mation to provide an annual historical reference to launches of all roe~ · 
ket vehicles (larger than sounding rockets) launched either by NASA or 
under "NASA direction" (e.g. ComSatCorp's Intelsat Satellites). Since 
the publication is about two years in preparation, timely information 
for launchings in 1972 and 1973 comes from NASA Activities, a monthly 
review of NASA's work. However, this news.letter does rot provide the 
detail or depth of the yearly reports. 
Ground Support 
The principal source of information relative to mishaps in the space 
program supportive functions is a compilation of mishaps covering several 
years of space flight activity by NASA, Accidents/Incidents (1963-1971). 
This reference report briefly describes the mishaps, possible causes, 
and recommended corrective actions of over 700 accident~/incidents (re-
ported in approximately 15,000 documents) which reflected significant les-
sons, involved equipment and facilities providing direct support to the 
space program, or resulted in personal fatalities and/or injuries. The 
majority of accidents/incidents selected occurred during various phases 
of the Apollo or other manned space programs. 
Problems/Reservations 
There are three residual problems basically associated with the use 
of secondary data (data which the analyst must accept in its form or no 
17 
form and use to his advantage): 
(1) Valuation of Injury, Mission and Hardware - In reports of acci-
dent/failures there is no definitive yardstick to measure the 
degree of damage and to allow reconstruction by later investi-
gators. Valuation is typically reported by such interpretive 
titles as "minor damage,'' "considerable injury, 11 "damage to 
wiring," or "damage to test facility." 
(2) Missiri.gRData,:e- In many descriptions of mishaps the propellant 
and/or system involved in the incident is not specified, due 
mainly to the destruction of evidence by the act itself. 
(3) Reporting Format~'- There is no established format for classif .. 
fying the circumstances surrounding the incident. Since mishap 
data is collected and reported by the agency involved in the 
incident, the breakdown by firms involve.a with booster develop-
ment will be different from the breakdown by firms developing 
and testing reaction control thrusters. 
Summary 
This methodology development sought to anticipate problems and to 
identify data sources. By considering the data format and availability, 
an inquiry was designed which allowed for the imperfectly arranged data 
to be used. There were some residual problems such as valuation, missing 
data, and reporting format which were identified and discussed. 
DATA 
The data will be presented in three parts - (1) launch vehicle ex-
perience, (2) spacecraft system experience, and (3) ground support exper-
ience. The-first two sections will be concerned with 1he failure record 
of propulsion systems, the last section, the accident record. 
Fl)gght 
Launch Vehicle 
Of the 260 major NASA launchings from 1 October 1958 to 31 December 
1973 there were 42 vehicles which failed to perform satisfactorily. 
These 42 failures are tabulated in Figure 3 by (1) launch vehicle and by 
(2) mode of failure. The active failures (explosions, disintegrations, 
or RSO destructions) totaled 4% of the launch attempts. All failures, 
(both active and passive) totaled 16% of launch attempts. 
A breakdown of the failures by genetic stages is given in Appendix 
B. Of _particular interest is the Agena and Centaur performance. The 
Centaur vehicle did not experience an -ctive failure during 15 years 
and 33 exposures. The Agena vehicle had 1 act_ive failure in 43 attempts. 
On 25 October 1965 the Agena stage target vehicle (Gatv) for the Gemini 
6 rendezvous disintegrated at time of ignition of _the main Agena engine. 
This failure caused postponement of the luanch of Gemini 6, which later 
rescheduled to rendezvous with Gemini 7. 
18 
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NASA SPACE LAUNCH RELIABILITY, 1 OCTOBER 1958 - 31 DECEMBER 1973 
Vehicle Exposures Failures/Mode Observed Reliability 
Active ."'.".Passive All - Active 
Atlas/agena 26 1 5 o.n o. 96 
Atlas/centaur 35 2 4 0.83 0.94 
Thor/agena 13 1 0.92 0. 92 
Thor/delta 99 2 7 0.91 0.98 
Saturn V 13 1 0.92 1.00 
Saturn 1, lB, 
C-1 18 1.00 1.00 
Tital 11 12 1.00 1.00 
Juno. 11 r 
C/' 
10 1 5 0.40 0.90 
Atlas 13 2 0.85 0.85 
Jupiter c 11 1 0.00 1.00 
Thor/able 5 2 0.60 1.00 
Vanguard 4 3 0.25 1.00 
Atlas/able 3 1 2 0.00 0.67 
Thor 2 1.00 1.00 
Atlas/Gatv 6 1 1 0.67 0.83 
total 260 11 31 0.84 0.96 
Figure 3: NASA LAUNCH VEHICLE RELIABILITY 
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SYSTEM.RELIABILITY, l OCTOBER 1958 - 31 DECEMBER 1973 ' 
System Design Exposures Failures Observed Reliability 
Oxidizer - Fue.1 Ac tive-Ba~siw.es;;" All - Active 
cryogenics 77 - 7 0.91 LOO 
LOX - storable 253 9 10 0.92 0.96 
Storables 176 2 18 0.89 0.99 
Figure 4: . SYSTEM.RELIABILITY 
Additional breakdown of the failures by stage design is tabulated in 
Figure 4. The launch experience of the cryogenic design historically has 
fewer faiLures than the launch experience of. thestorable design, but any 
evaluation must take into account that the cryogenics were employed in 
56% fewer launches than were the storables. The hyijrid systeins - cryo-
genie oxidizer and storable fuel - show little S1peri0rity in total per-
formance; however, their active failures experience is the poorest of all 
three systems. 
Spacecraft 
The Apollo spacecraft has been virtually free of mission-threatening 
failures, with the exception of the much publicized Apollo 13 failure. 
In the Apollo 13 mishap the blow-out plug in cryogenic oxygen tank 
2 of the service m0.dule ruptured when electrical shorts in the tank's 
fan circuits caused pressure and temperature increases. This failure 
resulted in the loss of power in two of t'fr.e".three service module's fuel 
cells, forcing the astronauts to abandon the command-service module and 
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m:1e the lunar module as a "lifeboat" in an aborted lunar mission. 
Although minor anomalies were noted, all propulsion systems were 
otherwise judged satisfactory in post-mission reports. This record 
speaks well for storable systems·in that they are the only propellants 
employed in the spacecraft's propulsion systems. The Apolilio 13 mishap, 
although not a propulsion failure, serves to illustrate the experience 
of a cryogenic material in spaceflight.· Figure 5.is a review of the 
Apollo systems. 
A post-flight accident with Apollo 16 occurred during detanking of ·,, 
the CM RCS. A s~rubber tank containing transferred N204 propellant and 
decontaminated agents exploded, causing physical injuries to two per-
sonnel and inhalation of fumes by·44 others. 
The Apollo launch vehicles, Saturn I and Saturn V, performed satis-
factorily, with the exception of the Apollo. 6 vehicle. Although Apollo 
6 was launched into earth orbit; two of the five second-stage engines 
scopped permaturely, and the third-stage engine failed to restart. How-
ever, the connnand module achieved intended apogee, reentered, and was 
recovered. These launches are included in Figure 2. 
Ground. Support 
There were 121 accident~/incidents which were determined to be pro-
pellant related: Propellants directly involved (as in the case of a fire) 
or propellants indirectly contributed to the hazard of a mishap (as in 
the case of a spill). In 11 cases the nature of the propellant involved 
(cryogenic or storable) could not be deduced from the narrative. 
The.distribution of mishaps is presented in Charts 6-8. The classi-
fications ''major accident," "minor accident,". and "incident" are somewhat 
APOLLO SYSTEMS, Apollo 4 - Apollo 17 
System Agents Approximate Load Mission Use 
Oxidizer - Fuel (lbs) Oxidizer -
>Euel 
Spacecraft 
SPS N204 - A-50 25,200 - 15,760 13 
SM RCS N204 - A-50 900 - 450 13 
CM RCS N204 - A-50 180 - 90 13 
ILM DPS N204 - A-50 11,300 - 7,000 10 
ILM APS N204 - A-50 3,200 - 2,000 9 
ILM RCS N204 - A-50 408 - 200 10 
!Power 
!Fuel 
Cells LOX - LH2 652 - 58 13 
Launch Vehicle 
S-lB LOX - RP-1 638,000 - , ;.72721000 2 
S-lC LOX - RP-1 3,312.000 - 1,411,000 12 
S-11 LOX - LH2 836,400 - 158,700 12 
S-lVB LOX - LH2 195,800 - 43,700 14 
S-lVB 
auxilliary LOX - LH2 400 - 250 14 
Figure 5: APOLLO SYSTEMS 
arbitrary indices of the extent of damage. "Major accident" invqlved da-
mage extensive to both the system and the facility. "Minor accident" 
involved damage confined to the system. "Incident" involved minimal da-
mage that could have resulted in extensive loss,, upon certain conditions. 
In addition to the damage severity, additional knowledge of the na-
ture of the mishap can be gained by examining the destructive consequences 
of the accident/incident. This '.lllOde classification is not as arbitrary as 
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the da~ge classification and, as experience data, points to different 
accident/incident events. 
The storables (N204, A-50, N2H4, and some unidentified hypergolics) 
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Figure 6: STORABLE ACCIDENTS 
were spills, leaks, and vapor releases classified as "incident." They 
wesulted in 14 instances in which personnel were injured or were exposed 
to dangerous situations. This :may be.somewhat misleading, as investiga-
tm.rs may be more inclined to report exposures to stora.bles (because of 
knowledge of the greater toxicity involved) than exposures to cryogenics. 
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The cryogenics (tOX and LH2) accounted for 50% of the mishaps ob-
served. The bulk of these mishaps - fires and explosions - were classi-
fied as "minor accidents," but they also included a fatality, all the 









~ bO - i:: 1,1 Q) •r-1 0 !,.! !,.! 
i:: i:;t.. ;:I •r-1 
0 Cl! .µ i:: r:r.. 
•r-1 :> 0. 0 
U) - ~ -r-1 .µ 0 ~ .µ ·s:I .-I Cl! Cl! Cl! 
~ 
Q) Q) i:: .µ 
....:i !,.! •r-1 !,.! 
rz:l - ;:I ~ Q) - .-I U) ~ Q) .-I U)· .µ !,.! •r-1 Q) i:: Cl! 
•r-1 0. !,.! 0 i:: r:r.. Cl) p., u H 
Major Accident ·li - - - -
Minor Accident 27 - 4 - -
Incident 2 8 6 6 1 
:Fatality 1 - - - -
Injury 2 - 2 - -
Exposure - 1 1 - -
Figure 7: CRYOGENIC ACCIDENTS 
Appendix C presents information from a selected number of these 
propellant accidents, representative of the hazards inherent in handling 
of these materials and illustrative of the typical distribution in Fi-
·gures 6 and 7. 
Any conclusions as to the relative experience of ground-handling 
mishaps must be tempered by a knowledge of the use of the two materials 
25 
in the Apollo program. A review of .Figure 5 indicates an average of 5 
cryogenic and 5 storable systems in a typical mission. However, there 
are about 80 times as many crytogenic as storable materials handled (by 









H Q) ·r-1 
0 H H 
i:: p. ;:l ·r-1 
0 Cll .µ i:: J:r.i 
•r-1 :> p. 0 
00 - ;:l ·r-1 .µ 0 ~ ~ .µ ~ .-I Cll Cll 
~ 
Q) Q) i:: .µ 
,-.::i H ·r-1 H 
rx:i - ;:l ~ Q) - .-I 00 :> Q) .-I 00 .µ "O H •r-1 Q) i:: Cll 
·r-1 p. H 0 i:: 
J:r.i C/J p., u H 
Major Accident - --··- - - 1 
Minor Accident 3 - 2 - -
Incident 1 1 - - 3 
Fatality - - - - 1 
Injury - - 1 - -
Exposure - 1 - - -
Figure 8: UNSPECIFIED ACCIDENTS 
Summary 
This three-part data account sought to present both the failure and 
accident records of the two propellant systems. It was revealed that a 
one-to-one comparison was not always possible because of different ex-
posure levels. 
CONCLUSION 
This study sought to resolve the issues of propellant hazards by in-
vestigation the safety records of present cryogenic and storable systems. 
This study was undertaken because of a dispersion of data and the con-
sequential reliance upon intuitive measure by program officials. The 
conclusions are divided into two parts: (1) Findings of Present Study 
and (2) Recommendations for Future Studies. This arrangement facilitates 
the use of the present work while offering guidelines for later research. 
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Findings of Present Study 
As systems, cryogenic and storabli'e propellant vehicle stages show 
little differences in performance. The experience record of the Agena 
and Centaur upper stages both approximate the total vehicle performance c 
of all stages and have shown a reliability of 98% and 100% respectively, 
against active failures. 
The employment of storable propellants in the Apollo systems exhi-
bits a clean record so far as mission-threatening anomalies are concerned. 
Even though these systems do not employ the same propellants as the Agena 
vehicle, these accomplishments must not be overlooked when judging the 
experience of the materials as potential Tug/third stage candidates. 
This observation is of special importance, because the lunar module's 
functions - rendezvous and docking, orbit altitude and plane changes, and 
starts in orbit - closely resembel those requirements of the Tug/third 
stage. 
The ground-support experience of the propellants confirms the dissim-
ilar nature of the materials and verfies hazards unique to both types of 
propellants. As to which of these materials experienced the better or 
poorer record, it r.emains a question as to which materials were exposed 
to a greater employment risk in the Apollo program. The~starables were 
involved in fewer and less violent mtishaps; however, they were handled in 
smaller quantities and consequently, there were limited as to the amount 
of fuel and oxidizer necessary for the major fires and explosions typical 
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of cryogenic accidents .• 
The shuttle System's Tug/third stage will P.resent problems unique to 
space flight. There is no present system which parallels this application 
from which to draw historical data. However, because of (1) their proven. 
success in the Apjllllo program and (2) their comparable experience as an 
upper stage vehicle and (3) their handling record, the storables represent 
a historically reU.able system design· fo:t · application to the Shuttle Sys-
tem's Tug/third stage. 
Recommendations for Future Studies 
A study such as this arises because of an immediate problem and 
concludes when that problem is resolved. Each problem differs from the 
last, and each involves different program elements. 
If similar safety studies are to be undertaken, it is recommended 
that original documents be secured as the 1:a.sis for the investigation. 
As data is summarized and abstracted, detail and depth is sacrificed for 
conciseness. This brevity leaves no more than a skeleton of a descrip-
tion from which to reconstruct the event. A more rigorous study could be 
possible if detailed, first-hand ace.aunts of the mishap were used. This 
approach would facilitate the classification or events according to prior 
definitions (e.g. NASA definitions -- Type A, Type B, and incident) and 
possibly provide insight into other distributions (e.g. program activity 
or calendar year). 
A measure of the activity level (or exposure risk) is essential to 
a safety study. Without a risk measure, the comparison framework lacks 
a base upon which to bring out the characteristics of each element. In 
the Space program, the activity level not only fluctuates but the exposure/ 
2.9 
risk level itself is inconsistent. Even if the· exposure/risk level and 
activity levels are known, the degree that the interaction of these dif-
ferent measures/determine different accident/failure events may be un-
known. 
Finally, this study could be expanded to included agencies outside 
NASA (such as the Air Force and Department of Defense) which conduc~ 
programs (largely defense-orientated) involving the use of rockets and 
the development of rocket systems. However, the records of these pro-
grams are felt to be sensitive to the National fficurity and, consequent-
ly, involve materials available only to personnel with security clear-
ances. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 4, 
MSC-PA-R-68--1, January, 1968. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 5, 
MSC-PA-R-68-7, March, 1968. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 6, 
MSC-PA-R-68-9, June, 1968. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 7, 
MSC-PA-R-68-15, December, 1968. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 8, 
MSC-PA-R-69~1, February, 1969. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 9, 
MSC-PA-R-69-2, May, 1969. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 10, 
MSC-00126, August, 1969. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 11, 
MSC-00171, November, 1969. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 12, 
MSC-01855, March, 1970. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apo11d 13, 
MSC-02680, Septembe.r, 1970. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 14, 
MSC-04112, April, 1971. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 15, 
MSC-05161, December, 1971. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 16, 
MSC-07230, August, 1972. 
Apollo Mission Reports, Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center. Apollo 17, 
JSC-07904, March, 1973. 
Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962. NASA,:Washington, D. C.: 
U. S, Government Printing Office, 1963. 
30 
31 
Astronautics and Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, Offtce of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1963, SP-4004, published 1964. 
Astronautics ·and Aeronautics. NASA Historical Sta.ff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1964, SP-4005, published 1965. 
Astronautics and Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1965, SP-4006, published 1966. 
Astronautics and Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1966, SP.,-4007, published 1967 .• · 
Astronautics and.Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: u.:;s. G&vernmeat~Pli'inting Office. 
196 7, SP..i:-400ij ,(published' .. 1968. 
Astronautics and Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington,. D. C. :. U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1968, SP-4010, published 1969. 
Astronautics and Aeronautics. NA~A Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1969, SP~4014, published 1970. 
Astronautics and. Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1970, SP-4015, published 1971. 
Astronautr.i:.cs and Aeronautics. NASA Historical Staff, <l.ffice of Policy 
and Planning. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
1971, SP-4016, published 1972. 
"Basic Safety Requirement." NASA Safety Manual. · National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, July, 1969. 
Bazovsky, Igor. Reliability Theory and Practice. Englewood Cliffs, N. 
J.: Prentice-Ji.all Inc., 1961. 
Boyd et. al. Space Tug Propulsion System Failure, Mode, Effects and Cri-
ticality Analysis. Huntsville, Alabama: Teledyne Brown Engineering 
Research Park, May 11, 1972. · 
Canale, S. Hazard Risk Measurement and Optimization. Goddard Space 
Flight Center: Government-Industry System Safety Conference, May 
1-3, 1968. 
Hammer, Willie. Handbook of System and Product Safety. Englewood Cliffs, 
RJ",:',1 .. : Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972. 
The Handling and Storage of Liquid Propellants. 
Office of the Director of Defense Research 
uary, 1963. 
Washington, D. C.: 
and Engineering, Jan-
32 
Herd, G. Ronald. Reliability Analysis and Prediction. San Diego, Cali-
fornia: Seventh.Military-Industry Missile and Space Symposium, 
June 18-21, 1962. 
Manned. Spacecraft: Engineering Design and Operation. Edited by Paul E. 
Purser, Maxime A. Faget, and Norman F. Smith. New Xork: Fairchild 
Publications, Inc. , 1964. · 
NASA Activities. NASA. Washington, D. c.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, December, 1972. · 
NASA Activities. NASA. Washington, D. C.: U .- S. Government Printing 
Office, December, 1973. 
Ordway, Frederick I~. and Ronald C. Wakeford. Inte.rantional Missile and 
Spacecraft Guide. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960. 
Rodgers, William P •. Introduction to System Safety Engineering. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971 
Vesley, W. E. Evaluation of Failure and Failure Related Data. prepared 
for u; s. Atomic Energy Cotmnission, August, 1971. 
Wolf, R. M. The Application and Implementation of a System Safety En-
gineering Analysis.· Air Force Systems Colill)land, Los Angeles, Calif-
ornia: Apl. 9th Liquid Propulsion Symposium, Vol. 11, September, 
1967. 
APPENDIX A 
Discussion of the hazards inherent to 




Red Fuming Nitric Acid 
Liquid Hydrogen 
Health Hazards 
Hydrogen is not toxic in the usual sense. The liquid has a very low 
temperature, so serious "burns" can result when skin or other tissues come 
into contact with the liquid or with pipes and valves containint the.li-
quid. The gas can exclude oxygen and ca.use asphyxiation. Dold hydrogen 
vapors can also "burn" the skin. 
Fire~ 
Since the gas is extremely flammable, a serious fire hazard always 
exists when hydrogen-gas vapors are in the area. When no impurities are 
present, hydrogen burns in air with an invisible flame. Hydrogen~air 
mixtures containing as little as 4 percent or as wch as 74 percent hy-
drogen by volume are readily ignited. Hydrogen-oxygen mixtures are flam-
mable over the range of 4 to 94 percent by voiume. 
Explosion 
An explosive hazard exists when the hydrogen-air mixture is com-
pletely or partially confined. Such a mixture will propagate a detona-
tion wave when initiated by an explosive •. A deflagration will occur when 
this mixture is ignited from a spark source. Either type of ignition will· 
cause serious damage. Explosive hazards a1so exist in the presence of 
oxygen-enriched solid air or strong oxidizers. Pressure rupture can 
occur, with severe consequences, when the liquid is held in a closed sys-
tem with no refrigeration. Hydrogen cannot be .maintained as a liquid if 
its temperature rises .above -400°F regardless of the confining pressure. 
Liquid hydrogen trapped between valves can cause a violent rupture of 
the pipe, while the loss of refrigeration or vacuum insultation can cause 
a storage tank to rupture if the pressure is not: relieved by suitable de-
vices. Liquid hydrogen does not normally present an explosive hazard 
when it evaporates and mixes with air in an unconfined space.· 
Liquid Oxygen-
Health Hazards 
The health hazards of liquid oxygen are associated with its very 
low temperature. 
Fire 
Liquid oxygen does not burn but vigorous.ly supports combustion. 
Normally it is not hypergolic with fuels. Liquid oxygen causes liquid 
fuels to cool and freeze if both liquids are brought together. Such a 
mixture of frozen fuel and liquefied oxygen is shock-.sertsitive and can 
react with the violence of a detonation. This hazard must be considered 
in fir.e control and prevention measures taken in connection with' spills 
or liquid oxygen. Fire blankets.must not be used. 
Because gaseous oxygen can saturate normal clothing and make it ex~~ 
tremely flammable, workers must-not smoke or strike fires in oxygen stor-
age or handling areas or while. wearing clothing saturated with oxygen. 
Clothing will retain a high concentration of oxygen mor as long as an 
hour. 
Explosion 
When mixed with liquid oxygen, all materials that will. burn, es-
pecially rocket fuels, represent an explosion hazard. These mixtures can 
usually be exploded by static electricity, mechanical shock, electrical 
spark and other similar energy sources, especially when the mixtures 
are frozen. Under most conditions, the ordinary burning of rocke.tr£uels 
or other combustible materials, when mixed with liquid oxygen, may pro-
gress to a detonation. Thus, every fire of liquid oxygen is an explo-
sion hazard. · 
Whether leaking or spilling, liquid oxygen forms high concentration 
of oxygen gas, · During transfer operations, large 'l>lumes of gas are 
formed from the liquid's "boiling off~" In confined areas, gaseous oxy-
gen can form mixtures with fuel vapors that can be exploded by static 
electricity, electrical spark or flame. 
When liquid oxygen is trapped in a closed system and refrigeration 
is not maintained, pressure rupture may occur. Oxygen cannot be kept 
liquie if its temperature rises above -181.8°F, regardless of the con-
fining pressure. Liquid oxygen trapped between valves can malce the pipe 
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or tube rupture violently. Loss of refrigeration can cause the storage 
tank to rupture if the oxygen is not dumped or pressure-relieved by suit-
able devices. Theloss of vacuum in vacuum-jacketed tanks can cause eva-
poration to increase and overload an inadequately designed venting sys-
tem, which raises pressure. 
Unsynunetrical Dimethylhdrazine 
Health Hazards 
UDMH is a clear, mobile liquid of high volatility. It :is slightly 
alkaline and mildly caustic to tissue. 
Fire 
UDMH vapor is flammable in air over a very wide range of concentra-
tions.•. UDMH is hypergolic with some oxidants,· such a;s fuming nitric 
acids, nitrogen tetroxide, hydrogen peroxide,. chlorine triflouride and 
fluorine. 
Materi&ls with a large surface area, such as rags, cotton waste, 
wood scraps and excelsior, that have absorbed UDMH should not be stored 
under conditions that prevent the dissipation of heat that can evolve 
by the gradual process of air oxidation:-.and may eventually cause spon-
taneous ignition. When,UDMH comes into contact with such organic ma-
terials, it may cause fire. · 
Explosion 
UDMH vapors greater than 2 percent in air·can be exploded by an ele-
ctric spark or an open flame. Liquid UDMH is not sensitive to shock or 
friction. 
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Red Fuming Nitric Acid 
Health Hazards 
Since all fuming nitric acids are very corrosive liquids, they are 
very hazardous on contact with the body. Type III acids (RFNA) contain 
oxides of nitrogen in solution which are readily released into the at-
mosphere. On contact with a variety of materials, such as organic com-
pounds, many metals and wood, all types of nitric acids produce addi-
tional fuwes of nitrogen oxides, of which the most dangerous is nitro-
gen dioxide. 
Fire 
Nitric acids by themselves will not burn. The fumes liberated by 
the acids support combustion. 
·Explosion 
Although nitric acid is stable to mechanical shock and impact, upon 
contact with certain fuels (such as the hydrazines or furfuryl alcohol) 
it will react violently. Nitric acid will .form explosive mixtures with 
nonhypergolic fuels (such as hydrocarbons) and with hypergolic fuels if 
either the fuels or the nitric acid contain excessive water. High tem-
perature in confined spaces may cause containers or other equipment.to 
rupture from pressure build-up. 
Source: 
c. : 
The Handling and Storage of Liquid Propellants. Washington, D. 




Sunnnary of genetic stage performance 
in major NASA launchings 
NASA SPACE LAUNCH RELIABILITY, 1 OCTOBER 1958 - 31 DECEMBER 1973 
Genetic Stage Oxidizer - Fuel ' Exposure Failures/Mode Observed Reliability 
Active - Passive All - Active 
Centaur LOX - LH2 33 5 0.85 1.00 
Agena RFNA - UDMH 43 1 7 0.81 0.98 
Atlas LOX - KP-1 83 6 3 0.89 0.93 
Thor LOX - RP-1. 119 2 2 0.97 0.98 
Delta IRFNA - UDMH · · 99 1 5 0.94 0.99 
Saturn V 
S-IC. LOX - RP-1 13 1.00 1.00 
S-11 LOX - LH2 13 1 0.92 1.00 
S-IVB LOX - LH2 13 1 0.92 1.00 
Saturn 1, lB, C-1 -·-
S-1 LOX - RP-1 18 1.00 1.00 
S-lVB LOX - LH2 18 1.00 1.00 
Titan II 
1 N204 - N2H4 + UDMH 12 1.00 1.00 
2 N204 - N2H4 + UDMH 12 1.00 1.00 
NASA SPACE LAUNCH RELIABILITY, 1 OCTOBER 1958 - 31 DECEMBER 1973 
Genetic Stage Oxidizer - Fuel Exposure Failures/Mode Observed Reliability 
Active - Passive All - Active 
Jupiter C, LOX - Hydyne 1 1 o.oo 1.00 
Juno 11 LOX - RP-1 10 1 2 0.70 0.90 
Redstone LOX-ethyl alcohol+ 5 1 0.80 1.00 
water 
~ ,J ~ .SL · 
Able WFNA - UDMH 6 3 0.50 1.00 
Vanguard 
( 
1 LOX - RP-1 4 1 0.75 1.00 
2 WFNA - UDMH 4 3 0.25 1.00 
Source: Astronautics and,iAeronautics .1958-1971, prepared by the NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy 
·Planning. and: NASA Activities. NASA. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
APPENDIX C 
Selection of propellant accidents 
in the Apollo program 
SELECTION OF PROPELLANT ACCIDENTS IN THE. APOLLO PROGRAM 
Accident/Incident Description 
During a demonstration test involving nine . 
pressure and temperature count~downs to de-
monstrate certain capabilities of foam in-
sulation, a LOX tank dome ruptured and 
scattered throughout the test area. 
Following loading of propellant run tanks 
in preparation for a firing of a vehicle 
stage, the insulation jacket-for the test 
stand LH2 storage tank burst, due to ex-
panding cryogenic liquid and generation and 
storage of liquid air. Theburst disc pn 
the jacket failed to relieve the arer-
pressure condition. 
Main stage exploded during final, count-· 
down phase of static firing, destroying the 
stage ~nd causing major damage to the faci~ 
lity. 
Major damage to a test facility occured when 
a LH2 Dewar exploded during conduct of lab-
oratory tensil tests of metals at cryogenic 
temperature. Two explosions occurred, the 
initial one equivalent to~ pound of TNT and 
a secondary explosion, from mixing of released 
vapors, of a much higher order. 
Causes 
Failure to proof test the 
tank after rework. Contri-
buting causes were poor 
workmanship in the welding 
and inadequate inspection of 
welds. 
Failure of the burst disc. to 
relieve the arerpressure was 
due to ice formation. Design 
should have taken into cori- · 
sideration the possibility of 
the insulation leaking "in" 
moist air and the formation of 
ice on the.disc. 
Failure ci:. the LOX vent valve 
to function; due to solid LOX 
particles. Contributing 
causes were failure to follow· 
approved procedures and an un-
satisfactory Helium shut off 
valve during cold conditions. 
A design deficiency in the ·c..::.' :. 
test installations. Two 
elemtric heaters being used 
to accelerate boil-off pro~ 
vided the ignition source 
when the surface temperature 
was allowed to rise too high. 
Ai_r had entered the dewar 
through the. dewar vent, and air 






Explosive characteristics of 
hydrogen. 
Explosive characteristics of 
hydrogen 
Accident/Incident Description 
During de-fueling operations after a test, 
a fire occured at the vent when LOX was ignited 
by an electrical short during venting. 
During planned LOX discharge from a stor-
age tank into a drainage ditch, three au-
tomobiles in the area caught fire and were 
destroyed. One driver,,narrowly escaped 
severe injury. 
During disconnection of a line to an oxi-
dizer transfer tank, residual N204 vapor 
escaped, resulting in burns to both hands 
of the technician. Technician was wearimg 
an.acid suit, hood, and goggles but did 
not have gloves. 
Puring preparation for vacuum drying oper-
ations on a flight configuration ball valve 
package, following cleaning operations, a 
puff of N204 fuel was released when GN2 
pressure and electrical power was applied 
to the valve. Personnel received minor 
nose and throat irritations. 
Causes 
through cryogenic pumping 
of air through the porous· 
foam insulation in the top 
of the dewar. · 
A design deficiency in the 
test installation in that 
the LOX vent was located in 
a manner in which vapors were 
emitted in the area of elec-
trical wiring. 
Personnel error in that em-
ployees who were handling 
the .road block operations, 
during the LOX discharge, 
drove autos into an area 







Verification was not made :.:. ,3. Toxicity of propellants. 
that residual pressure in 
the line had been relieved. 
Th~ line did not have a re-
lief valve for bleeding off 
residual vapors. 
A design deficiency in that Toxicity of propellants. 
tlie electrical larness used 
to operate the '1:1.lve during 
cleaning operations allowed 
only one half of the valve 
to operate,~ resulting in in-
complete cleaning and N204 
entrapment. 
Accident/Incident Description 
Fuel and oxidizer were inadvertently mixed 
during a Development Test, causing extensive 
damage to the engine and test instrumentation. 
During routine calibration for a facility 
test cell, inadvertent actuation of fuel 
and oxidizer valves caused fuel and oxi-
dizer to be spilled on test cell floor 
causing a fire. Three test cell personnel 
escaped injury; however, minor equipment 
damage occured. 
A propellant system exploded during a test 
when N204 was introduced to the system due 
to residual cleaning fluid in the system 
(Halogenated Carbon solvents). 
An explosion occured during a test when 
N204 and ethylene/glycol water solution 
were inadvertently mixed when a leak 
occured in the ethylene/glycol system 
Cause 
Inadequate test procedure 
which permitted the operator 
to open a valve out of se-
quence. 
Hand and signal communica-: 
tions resulted in the inad-
vertent actuation of two 
valves. Contributing causes 
were lack of proper protec-
tiv.e equipment in the test 
ceill and lack cf. writ ten 
procedures for operating the 
control console. 
Failure to properly purge 
the system after using 
cleaning solvents and fail-
ure to determine compati-
bility of solvents with 
N204. 
A design deficiency in the 
test installation in that 
incompatible systems were. 
located in a manner which 
permitted inadvertant mixing. 
Hazard Illustration 
Hypergolic ignition of pro-
pellants. 
Hypergolic ignition of pro~ 
pellants. 
Spontaneous ignition with 
certain materials. 
Spontaneous ignition with 
certain materials. 
Source: Manned Program Accident/Incident Summaries (1963-1971), General Electric Company, Daytona Beach, 
Florida and Cranston Research, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia. 
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